The U.N., along with President George W. Bush, has demanded that Saddam Hussein grant the U.N. Monitoring Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) access to sites in Iraq. The inspectors haven’t been permitted in the country since 1998. But last Friday, the Iraqis announced they were withdrawing from the U.N. meeting. NEWSWEEK’s Gregory Beals spoke with UNMOVIC executive chairman Hans Blix about Iraqi weapons of mass destruction.

NEWSWEEK: What’s your response to the Iraqi decision to withdraw from the talks?

Hans Blix: The green light for inspection is delayed. It’s up in the air in the moment when we will meet again.

How seriously have the Iraqis taken the issue of complying with inspections in the past?

It’s a mixed bag, clearly. In the past, there was a lot of presentation of documents and declaration of weapons, but there was also a lot of obstruction and concealment. In the beginning, Iraq denied that it was enriching uranium [for the development of nuclear weapons]. But when they were provided evidence to the contrary, they declared a great deal. Their biological weapons program was another example where they denied weaponization that they later admitted. There continue to be a large number of questions over their biological program.

What must the Iraqis do if the inspectors arrive?

It is not enough that Iraq invites us to inspections. They must make the effort to present evidence that there are no weapons of mass destruction left. I have some understanding of the Iraqi argument that it is hard to prove the negative. However, they have the archives of the state, and it was a very well-organized state. They have the budgets, instructions, bills of lading and transportation reports. They have the material with which to trace what weapons remain or to demonstrate in a convincing matter that they have been eradicated.

Why should Iraq provide the locations of their weapons of mass destruction when they are currently under threat of invasion from the United States?

They should not only tell, but they should cooperate in the destruction of these weapons. I do not find it credible that they would have any use of these weapons in an armed conflict. They did not use any of these weapons in 1990. And I don’t think that it is credible that they would use them in another conflict.

So you believe that if the United States were to take armed action to oust Saddam from power, Iraq would not be willing to use biological or chemical weapons?

Nothing in this world is sure. But, as in the first conflict, there would be very strong factors restraining them from doing such a thing.

What arguments would you make to those in Washington who believe that Iraq must be invaded?

I know that some people are skeptical that this will not lead anywhere. And I am not asserting that we would have the cooperation and respect from Iraq that would create an environment of confidence. I hope that, if Iraq takes the decision that it would have inspectors back, it would be with the mind to perform the full cooperation necessary to suspend sanctions. However, I cannot know whether that is the case.

Assuming that there was armed action against Iraq, wouldn’t it be necessary for some arms-monitoring agency to come in and verify that weapons of mass destruction no longer exist in a post-Saddam environment?

Maybe so.

What are the limits of inspections? If you came in tomorrow, how quickly would it take for you to come to a conclusion?

It would be misleading to say that you will be able to explain every question that might have been raised. Or that you could give assurance that every piece of equipment or computer program will have been found and destroyed. There will always be after the best of inspections a small residue of uncertainty. It is a political question for governments to decide whether and how much uncertainty they will tolerate and accept.

We are dealing with a regime that the world largely mistrusts. To what extent do the activities of outside intelligence agencies become important in identifying potential sources of weapons of mass destruction?

They are very important. They may point to sites that could be visited. We cannot assess the various sources that the intelligence agencies have, but if they indicate a certain place where they believe weapons of mass destruction exist, then we can go there. This is in some ways an advantage for Iraq. If they maintain that there is nothing, and suspicions are directed to a particular place, then what is better than to have impartial inspectors to go to that place and verify that there was nothing. In fact that has happened.

Do you have any doubt that Iraq is attempting to rebuild its arsenal of weapons of mass destruction?

I think it would be inappropriate for me to voice any opinion. At the same time, it would be naive of me to exclude that may be the case.

How extensive do you expect any inspections to be? In the past Iraq has claimed that they were too intrusive.

There are no sanctuaries. Access must be immediate, unconditional and unrestricted. But I have also added that it is not our job to humiliate or harass the Iraqis.

Will there be surprise inspections?

Of course there will be no-notice inspections. It increases credibility. It is in the interest in the Iraqis, as well, that access be immediate, unconditional and unrestricted. We are not making any changes in practices that UNSCOM [the U.N. Special Commission on Iraq] pursued.

Who will be allowed to inspect? Will former inspectors from UNSCOM be allowed to go out into the field?

We have trained 230 people, some of these have been on inspections before. They will be U.N. civil servants. In the past they were often people who were on the salaries of [governments]. People who have been on inspections before will take part-from all nationalities, including Americans.