Al Qaeda’s second in command, Al-Zawahiri, has been fighting alongside Islamic extremists since the 1970s and has been associated with bin Laden since the 1980s, when the two fought together in the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan. The 52-year-old Egyptian-born physician helped found the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, the group that assassinated Egyptian President Anwar Sadat in 1981, serving three years in prison after being one of hundreds rounded up for their roles in that plot. After his release, he remained the head of Islamic Jihad but left Egypt for Afghanistan, where he joined forces with bin Laden and Al Qaeda. Since then, he’s been blamed for a number of acts of terror, from the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings in Africa to the September 11 attacks.
Bruce Hoffman has been studying terrorism for about as long as Al-Zawahiri has been involved in it. Hoffman, 49, is currently the director of the Washington office of the RAND Corporation, a nonprofit research institution. The founding director of the well-known center for the study of terrorism at Scotland’s University of St. Andrews, he is also the editor in chief of Studies in Conflict and Terrorism and the author of two books on the subject. NEWSWEEK’s Jennifer Barrett spoke to Hoffman about the significance of Al-Zawahiri’s possible capture. Excerpts:
NEWSWEEK: How important is it to find Al-Zawahiri?
Bruce Hoffman: It’s enormously important in two dimensions. It’s certainly important symbolically because he is at the head of one of the world’s most heinous terrorist organizations. And, after September 11, we put a price on his head as well as the other senior leaders and bin Laden’s, and in essence swore to bring them to justice.
What effect would this have on bin Laden and Al Qaeda?
Operationally, it will have a big effect. Zawahiri had enormous influence over the movement and was central to its transformation from a mostly regional group with a very discreet agenda to its transformation after the merger with Egyptian Islamic Jihad into a transnational movement with a global agenda. But that said, the impact two years ago of apprehending Zawahiri might have had more of a practical impact than it would now. Given now, as we see in Madrid, we face the terror threat of many Al Qaedas–not just one.
Al-Zawahiri reportedly played a critical role in consolidating Al Qaeda’s alliances with other terror groups. How widespread is his influence?
I think it was very widespread. It was this transformation of Al Qaeda into a global terrorist movement, predicated upon affiliates and associated groups and forging some bonds, no matter how loose, with them.
Now that the bonds have been established, would his removal have less effect on those groups’ operations?
We can’t say that these other groups wouldn’t have surfaced if he had been caught. But he and bin Laden built a movement they intend will outlive them, that would have a longevity beyond their lives. Two years ago that process was much more inchoate.
What about the effects on Al Qaeda itself?
When Al Qaeda was smashed in Afghanistan, dislodged and essentially dispersed throughout the region, its centralized power diminished. The problem today, though, is that you have many Al Qaedas, not just one. These groups are affiliated or associated with Al Qaeda, but not necessarily following orders from some central command. The question we have to ask is: would Zawahiri’s apprehension two weeks ago have had an effect on the Madrid attacks? We don’t know, but my guess would be probably not. They were committed doubtlessly by radical jihadists completely sympathetic and supportive of Al Qaeda and bin Laden’s and Zawahiri’s message, but I’d guess it was likely committed not by an Al Qaeda group but by an associate or affiliate. That’s sobering.
I’ve heard Al-Zawahiri referred to as the CEO of al Qaeda while bin Laden is the chairman of the board. Is that an apt metaphor?
Yes, I think so. But the real key is that they each had abilities that complemented one another. Bin Laden is widely viewed among those who have met him as modest and humble, that he is engaging and has a warmth and charisma about him, while Zawahiri was seen as a much more cerebral and aloof, perhaps arrogant and implacable, type. That may have been amongst bin Laden’s appeals in merging with Egyptian Islamic Jihad and bringing Zawahiri into the fold. This is the key to good management. A strong leader has strong managers and that would be the relationship between bin Laden and Zawahiri.
How much influence do you think he’s had over bin Laden?
I think it’s been significant. It is difficult to gauge, but before the merger in the late 1990s, Al Qaeda was mostly a regional group concerned with liberating the Arabian peninsula from American and British crusader forces. It was generally restricted to operating pretty much in a fairly defined geographical locus. It’s not coincidental that you have this merger with EIJ [Egyptian Islamic Jihad] and Al Qaeda develops this global jihadist vision and also develops transnational terrorist capabilities. Zawahiri brought the vision and the personnel in EIJ, warriors and professionals, that made the simultaneous bombings of the U.S. embassies possible. And that really put Al Qaeda on the map. Virtually no one really paid that much attention to bin Laden before the embassy bombings or took the threat of Al Qaeda all that seriously. The transformation, when it came, was because of the merger with EIJ and Zawahiri’s influence over the movement.
Attorney Montasser El-Zayat, a former friend of Al-Zawahiri’s who represented him in Egyptian courts, was quoted as saying that Al-Zawahiri is to bin Laden “what the brain is to the body.” Where would bin Laden be without him?
I think it is taking it a little too far. When the brain dies, the body dies. He may be like a kidney. A kidney is essential, but you could still lose one and the body still functions.
What would have more impact? Al-Zawahiri taken dead or alive?
If he dies, he dies a martyr. He inspires emulation and succession. If he is captured, he risks being the next in a long line of pathetic, abject terrorist leaders … I think Zawahiri and bin Laden have built something that would outlive him so it’s better for us to capture him for exactly that reason. We have the opportunity to show these people up as fragile human beings.
But would his capture set off martyrlike attacks like suicide bombings?
We have to expect a spasm of this type of activity–the question is whether it is sustained or not.
Who else could fill Al-Zawahiri’s role in Al Qaeda?
It’s hard to say. People often rise to the occasion when they are in positions of authority. Throughout the past two and a half years, Al Qaeda, despite the tremendous punishment that has been meted out to it and the losses–somewhere between two thirds and three fourths of its leadership–has nonetheless shown a remarkable regenerative capability and remarkable corporate succession. There may be someone in the wings who is not as good as Zawahiri, but over time may become as effective.
Al-Zawahiri is reported to have remained close with Osama bin Laden. Could the U.S. be closing in on bin Laden, too?
That’s hard to say, because they may have split apart as the noose tightened. But at the same time, there may [only] be so many haystacks that needles can hide in.
From the reports coming in, it sounds like the U.S. forces are leaving the fighting to the Pakistanis. Is that a good idea–especially given that many people believe it was the use of surrogate fighters at Afganistan’s Tora Bora caves that allowed bin Laden to escape in the past?
There’s so many important issues of national pride and, equally important, not doing anything that would hurt Pakistani President Musharraf’s already tenuous rule in the country. For those reasons, the fact that they are the lead on this is appropriate.
How important would Al-Zawahiri’s capture be for President Bush in an election year?
The president himself in 2001 declared bin Laden [wanted] dead or alive and put enormous sums on the heads of leading terrorists around the world, so the capture or killing of Zawahiri represents an important step in making good on that pledge. And it’s a pledge that’s as important outside America as in America. There may be an incalculable deterrent value from this–that the United States brings to justice, doesn’t allow terrorist provocation to go unredressed, no matter how long it takes. That we are as patient and plan as thoroughly and as deliberately and as resolutely as our opponents do.
