AHTISAARI: The important thing was that at the end of this trilateral phase, we could reach a common position. Whatever the demands were, they had to be on one piece of paper. That made it possible for me and Chernomyrdin to go to Belgrade.
What happened when you and Chernomyrdin met Milosevic?
I started to read [the 10 points]. He asked whether this could be improved. I said: “Unfortunately not because I don’t have any authority and neither does Chernomyrdin to negotiate this.” He asked: “You couldn’t pass any messages?” I said: “No, I can’t.” I said that this is as good as it gets.
Did Milosevic see himself as a defeated man?
He didn’t look like a defeated man. He didn’t look any different than when I saw him the last time in 1993 when I was chairman of the Bosnia-Herzegovina working group. He never attempted to be friendly; he’s not that type. Not unfriendly either. He was very much in control. [His] people asked very matter-of-fact questions, but sometimes I could sense a little irritation in their voices.
Was the bombing the key factor in making Milosevic give in?
Definitely the bombing had an effect. I told Milosevic that earlier, before the bombing started, he had missed the boat when he didn’t agree to a military presence in Kosovo. But I said, “As we Finns say, it’s last winter’s snow so I’m not going to rub this in.” If a government fails so miserably with its own citizens, the international community must interfere in 1999. Otherwise, we couldn’t look in a mirror and we couldn’t face our own people.
Why did Milosevic stall after the agreement?
You had to go very carefully through this paper. I was on the phone with Milosevic three or four times during this process after the Belgrade trip. Milosevic assured me that they would stick with the plan. This had become a sort of Ten Commandments.
Will Milosevic survive?
I can’t answer that. Now when we are talking about reconstruction, it’s important that the international community imposes conditions. We have to demand things from them which will promote democracy in the country. We want to give them a European option in the sense that they can be part of a democratic Europe, provided they change their society.
Does this mean no aid as long as Milosevic is in power?
This bothers me a little. I’d rather say, let’s demand democratic changes and let’s monitor them. The democratization process should take care of him. We shouldn’t be shooting ourselves in the foot by making demands that don’t make sense.
How much of a danger was there that China might have vetoed the Security Council resolution?
In order to avoid that danger I decided that I had to go there. They were the only permanent member which hadn’t been properly briefed by anyone who participated in this negotiating process. They asked very tricky questions, some very delicate ones. I was very candid, very open with them. I didn’t ask how they would react. But they let me know that it was a difficult decision and they would abstain.
Now that Finland is taking over the EU presidency, how big a reconstruction plan will you push for?
The important thing is that we take a long-term view, recognizing that [democratization in the Balkans] won’t take place overnight. But it has to start.
