You’ve said the talks with Milosevic were the bleakest you’ve ever had with him. Negotiating with Milosevic has always been difficult because he is tricky, evasive, smart–and dangerous. However, in the past agreements had been reached, particularly at and right after the Dayton accords [which ended the war in Bosnia]. And compliance in Bosnia, particularly in regard to the safety of NATO troops, had been observed. But in this case there was an air of unreality about some of our discussions.
Why? There was an unbridgeable gap between his version of what was happening in Kosovo and ours. He and his military and civilian associates took the position that the offensive against the Albanians was in essence a Western media invention stimulated by KLA disinformation. He said there was no Yugoslav offensive against the Albanians, but only a few isolated police actions against criminals–a set of statements at sharp variance with what we understood to be true. This more than anything else–this position in the face of the escalating violence– was the reason I recommended to President Clinton and Secretary Albright that we terminate the talks. We could not allow the talks to be dragged out while the Yugoslav security forces rolled up villages. They would have simply become a smokescreen for delaying NATO action.
What was Milosevic’s mood? He was very calm, almost fatalistic, unyielding. He talked often and emotionally of Serb history, including specific references to [Yugoslav strongman] Tito’s defiance of Stalin.
Do you think he simply didn’t believe that NATO would act, finally, because of all the deadlines that have been allowed to pass previously? No. We did not leave Belgrade until I was 100 percent certain that Milosevic understood that our departure would trigger a major military action. Not only did he say he understood this, but his closest associate, Serbian President Milutinovic, told the National Assembly that same day that “Holbrooke has given us two choices: ‘ground troops or bombing’.” So the possibility that Milosevic thought this was a bluff was completely eliminated.
Some are speculating that you and Milosevic came to some kind of understanding–that after suffering some bombing, he would have the political cover with his own people to be able to talk about a settlement. True? We had absolutely no understanding on what will happen after the bombing. His last words to me were, “I wonder if we will ever see each other again.” My response was, “That depends on your actions, Mr. President.”
