STIER: Before you stormed the Parliament, how clear a plan did you have?
SAAKASHVILI: I did not have a precise plan [but] we knew we had to somehow enter Parliament to kick them out. Definitely, we were afraid all the way through. If they had seen our fear, they would have gotten really nasty, really aggressive.
It seemed to go so smoothly. But was it really that perfect?
To the superficial observer, it looked like a music festival, but it was not. It was very close to violence. It could have gone very, very badly. When we went into the Parliament, there were a lot of armed people there, and when we entered the square in front of Parliament, there were a lot of arms, busloads of weapons with the Adjarians [mostly police from the breakaway region of Adjara].
Shevardnadze declared a state of emergency, and [security forces later] said they had orders to kill me. But the troops and the police did not want to protect Shevardnadze. We were feeding them for 10 days before, because they were not paid salaries and didn’t get any food from the government. Nobody was willing to shoot, even the Adjarians.
What was the role of Russia and the United States in nudging Shevardnadze out?
Basically, Colin Powell refused to back [Shevardnadze] in his state of emergency. He said the state of emergency would be dangerous, it risked force and that force should not be used against peaceful demonstrators. Then the first thing [Russian Foreign Minister Igor] Ivanov did from the airport was to come to the rally in front of Parliament and then he spoke with the opposition for two and half hours. Only after that did he go to Shevardnadze. That was a clear indication that Russia was also not willing to support him any more. That was like his last escape.
What is the security situation now?
There are some generals in the Army who are very corrupt and very unhappy with my possible presidency. Since there is not another serious candidate, they don’t have the hope that we could be defeated at the polls. So what else can they do: stir up trouble and try to destroy the whole election process? That is a major risk.
Give us some idea of the extent of reform needed here.
We need to root out corruption [and] do this step by step. But we have a limited amount of time. We need first to create elite investigation units–small, well-paid, very well-selected people, with help from the FBI, and other enforcement agencies–to investigate corruption. We cannot deliver anything economically if we cannot combat corruption. But to combat corruption, the government should be strong, with enough revenue to sustain armed forces, police, security apparatus, courts. So it is like a Catch-22 situation–what’s first?
How do you account for the distinct unease among three breakaway regions–Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Adjara?
They are nervous about change. As long as Shevardnadze was here, there was the status quo. He was so bad in running the Georgian state itself; he would never have time to take care of them. They are afraid of a stronger Georgia, that’s obvious.
It’s not because I am rushing to war tomorrow, no. A stronger Georgia would diminish the chances of separatism ever succeeding.
How do you see the U.S.-Russia tug of war for influence in Georgia?
It is a very complicated situation we need to live with. Russian has decided a very pro-American government has taken over here. They are behaving strangely. Ivanov has been making very ambiguous comments and the Russian press has been saying: Saakashvili–No way. Why? Because I have a Western education. That’s a very primitive approach. They have the potential to stir up trouble if they decide to, but I don’t think that is in their interest. The U.S. certainly could pressure them on this and we are asking the Americans to do that.
